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I.  Introduction—a theoretical approach to asymmetric devolution 
 
  Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal 
arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, 
lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective.  As 
argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional 
and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public 
goods and services.  This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority 
to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization.  
However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of 
differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric 
treatment may be justified.  History, culture and language may influence how a group of 
people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority.  Some regions may 
have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture 
that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful 
of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements.  To 
accommodate differences in taste for independence,  autonomy, and fiscal authority, it 
may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government 
and the different regions comprising the country.
1 
 
  Another efficiency argument for asymmetric decentralization centers on 
differences among regions in their capacities for public administration.  Efficient 
provision of public goods and services as well as efficient decision making are reliant 
upon a well-functioning bureaucracy and supportive political institutions.  If some 
regions have greater capacities for running governments and public agencies than other 
regions, perhaps because these regions have historical experience with autonomy, it may 
be more efficient to devolve fiscal authority to these regions alone, or at least more 
quickly to these regions than to regions without sufficient administrative capability. 
 
  Neither of these efficiency arguments for asymmetric devolution may hold in 
perpetuity.  If fiscal authority is devolved in stages more or less quickly to different 
regions because of their different capacities, even the regions with less authority will, 
over time, develop administrative capabilities.  In the limit, administrative know-how 
should be similar across the regions and an asymmetric system may not be needed to 
achieve efficiency.  Similarly, as regional governments gain experience and as mutual 
trust between the central government and its regions develops, in other words, as a 
                                                  
1 See Petchey, Shapiro and Walsh (1997) for a discussion of differences across sub-national governments in 
values and in preferences for political structures.   2 
formerly centralized system matures into a decentralized one, differences in taste for 
independence and fiscal authority may dissipate, and the rationale for asymmetric 
treatment, embedded in historical and cultural differences, may no longer be compelling. 
  
  We explore the implications of these theoretical arguments for the case of Spain.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five additional sections.  In section II we 
argue the relevance of these theories to the Spanish case.  In section III we present 
information on economic, historical, and cultural diversity in Spain.  Sections IV and V 
are devoted to a description and evaluation of the system of fiscal decentralization in 
Spain.  We conclude in section VI with a discussion of the relevance of the Spanish 
experience for emerging democracies.   
 
II.  Relevance of theory to Spanish case 
 
In many respects the two economic efficiency reasons for an asymmetric decentralization 
system that we have identified were present in Spain at the time the decentralization 
process began in the late 1970s.  On one hand there were and continue to be regions with 
a strong sense of nationality, of identity differences in questions of language, culture, 
laws and even economic relationships. The majority of individuals in these regions have 
clear preferences for deciding and administering many aspects of  public intervention, 
without having to follow centrally decided policies. The Basque Country, Galicia and 
Catalonia, the so-called historic nationalities in Spain, are clearly identified in this group.  
 
Differences in public administration know-how were also present in Spain at the time the 
current decentralized system was discussed and established.  For centuries Navarra and 
the Basque Country had a particular political and fiscal arrangement (“fueros”) that 
survived centralizing attempts of different Kingdoms.  In fact, Navarra and one province 
in the Basque Country (Álava) kept part of this special arrangement even during Franco’s 
dictatorship, while the other two Basque provinces (Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa) that had not 
supported Franco's movement had their special regime abolished during that period. 
Catalonia established an autonomous regional government in 1932 that endured through 
the short-lived Second Republic and the three-year Civil War that started in 1936.  
Galicia adopted an autonomous system in 1936 that was never implemented because of 
the eruption of the Civil War. 
  
These three regions, the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia, with different degrees of 
intensity, have both preferences and experience to favor decentralization from an 
economic  efficiency perspective.  Navarra also had the experience, related to a long 
history of self-government and the existence of specific laws developed by them, and the 
preference to be autonomous, although possibly to a lesser extent given the lack of a 
strong national identity.  
 
At first glance, then, it seems that it was appropriate to design a decentralization process 
that would be asymmetric for the different regions, taking into account their preferences 
and their experience. We analyze whether the design and degree of asymmetry were 
appropriate and to what extent asymmetry eased or fueled the tensions that were present   3 
when Spain was designing not only a decentralized system, but also a democratic system 
that would enable the country to move away from a dictatorship that had endured for 
almost 40 years. When analyzing these issues we cannot forget that in addition to the 
cultural and historical differences across regions, there were, and still are, economic 
differences.  Because of these differences, some regions were concerned about what 




III.  Regional diversity in Spain 
 
Today Spain is divided into seventeen regions, called Autonomous Communities (see 
Figure 1), with regional governments that were created following the guidelines 
established in the democratic Constitution ratified in 1978.
2  These regions are diverse 
from many perspectives including history, culture, language and economic conditions.  
Understanding these differences may help understand the asymmetric fiscal 
decentralization model that was established in the late 1970s. 
 
The existence of Spain as a country dates back several centuries, and is the result of a 
long process that combined several k ingdoms and other forms of political organization. 
One important step towards the creation of Spain was the unification by marriage of the 
Kingdom of Castilla with the Kingdom of Aragón (which includes Aragón, Catalonia, 
Balearic Islands and Valencia) in the late 15th century.  The Spanish kingdom expanded 
and grew strong in Europe and America, though many local laws and autonomous forms 
of government prevailed for at least two centuries.  In the early 1700s, Felipe V, with the 
so-called “Decretos de Nueva  Planta,” abolished the political and administrative 
autonomy of Aragón, Catalonia, Mallorca and Valencia, with the purpose of centralizing 
and unifying political power. This was especially painful for Catalonia, which had a long 
history of community and self-government, had been an important political and economic 
power in the Mediterranean, and had conquered the Balearic Islands and País Valenciano 
in the early 1200s. Although Catalonia unified with the Aragón Kingdom by marriage in 
the early 1100s, the organization was a confederation rather than a centralized kingdom, 
and therefore the autonomy and identity of Catalonia had remained.  
 
It is interesting to note that the very special political and economic organization of the 
three provinces of the Basque Country and of Navarra, the “fueros,” survived this 
centralizing attempt by the Spanish kingdom. The reasons seem quite clear, and are 
linked to the support that these provinces provided to the King in his political conflicts. 
The special arrangement for these provinces allowed them to keep a wide range of 
autonomy, with an independent fiscal authority and even a free trade area that prevailed 
until the mid-1800s. Although they lost some of their political autonomy in the late 
1800s, they kept a special fiscal arrangement that prevailed until Franco's dictatorship, 
and that for Navarra and Álava even remained during that very centralized period.  
 
                                                  
2 The complexity of the fiscal decentralization model is explained in detail below.   4 
The historical and cultural diversity is in some regions enhanced by the fact that they 
have their own languages. There are four languages spoken:  Castilian, Catalan, Galician 
and Basque, plus several dialects.  In the late 19th and early 20th century the nationalistic 
sentiment of Galicia, the Basque Country and especially Catalonia became quite strong. 
These movements cannot be considered in isolation from the fact that these three regions 
each have their own language, a major identifying characteristic.  It is also interesting to 
note that these three regions either established an autonomous government during the 
Second Republic or had approved an autonomous status and were in the process of 
establishing an autonomous government when the Civil War broke out in 1936.
3 
 
Spain is also a diverse country economically.  Per capita income and GDP differ across 
regions, although differences are not as big as in other European countries such as 
France, Italy or Germany.
4  As can be seen from Table 1, the richest region, Madrid, has 
a GDP per capita more than twice that of the poorest region, Extremadura.  Differences in 
the 1950s were even larger, with the richest regions having an income per capita three 
times that of the poorest, but by the mid-1970s the differences had fallen to a factor of a 
little over two, and have remained essentially unchanged ever since. 
 
The industrial mix of the country was quite diverse years ago, with the north (mainly the 
Basque Country) and northeast having most of the manufacturing, while the center (with 
the exception of Madrid), the south and the northwest were mainly agricultural.  The 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors have decreased in favor of the services sector, as 
has happened in most industrialized countries, but the strength of the regional economies 
is in most cases still related to the initial industrial mix.  Some regions, like the Balearic 
Islands, have strongly benefited from the tourism boom that Spain experienced in the last 
third of the century.  Madrid has taken advantage of being the political capital, building a 
strong economy and becoming the main financial center, the center for 
telecommunications, and the Spanish headquarters for many large international firms.  
 
Through public investment, and in some cases detailed development plans, the central 
government has attempted to help poor regions grow faster and catch up.  The 
effectiveness of these public actions on long run growth has not been proven, although 
short run effects were noticeable.  It is probably fair to say that some regional solidarity 
was built into the public investment policy of the central government before the 
decentralization process took place, which could explain why some regions feared that 
regional redistribution might vanish with the advent of decentralization.  On the other 
hand, once the decentralization process started, fears based on opposite grounds arose as 
regions did not want to be left out of any advantages associated with the decentralized 
system.  
 
Economic, cultural and historical diversity influences and constrains the type of 
decentralization model that may be designed.  In the following section we analyze how 
the diversity of the Spanish regions influenced the decentralization system adopted in 
Spain in the late 1970s. 
                                                  
3 A comprehensive historical analysis of Spain and its regions can be found in Fusi (1989). 
4 Hall (1999) and Esteban (1999) illustrate this fact.   5 
 
IV.  Fiscal decentralization in Spain 
 
Democratization and decentralization processes cannot really be separated in  Spain.  In 
fact, the basic structure of the state of the autonomies is contained in the Constitution, 
which was ratified by referendum in December 1978 and defines the start of democracy 
in Spain.  While the concept of asymmetry is established in the Constitution, its details 
are developed in a high level law,  “Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas,” (LOFCA) passed in 1980.  The third set of relevant laws is the “Statutes of 
Autonomy,” developed and approved by each region in accordance with the general 
principles of the Constitution.  
 
The Constitution establishes two possible layers of asymmetry. The first and most 
important enacts two completely different systems of decentralization, the Foral and the 
Common regimes.  The Foral regime is instituted for only the Basque Country and 
Navarra, the Common regime for the other fifteen regions (see Table 1).  The primary 
difference between the two regimes is that regions in the Foral regime have authority to 
raise taxes locally, whereas regions in the Common regime have limited local taxing 
authority5.  In terms of spending responsibilities, the regions of the Foral regime have 
similar responsibilities to five regions under the Common regime. 
 
Under the Foral regime the majority of the taxes are ceded (impuestos concertados) to the 
autonomous government, giving responsibility for tax administration and, subject to 
constraints, autonomy to set rates and bases to the regions.  The major taxes—income, 
corporate, wealth, inheritance and wealth transfers—are fully administered by the 
regional governments.  Thus, in the Foral regime citizens do not pay any part of these 
taxes to the central government.  In 1997 a reform was passed that extended the taxing 
authority of the regions, easing many of the constraints.  The value added tax (IVA) is 
collected and administered by the regional government, but without any authority to set 
rates or define the base.  
 
To compensate for the services that the central government provides to the region, the 
regional government pays an amount to the central government (“cupo” for the Basque 
Country and “aportación” for Navarra).  The “cupo” and “aportación” are essentially 
grants or transfers from the regional government to the central government. The central 
government directly raises some minor taxes and these revenues are taken into account 
when the “cupo” and “aportación” are calculated. 
 
Contrary to a cost-accounting basis, the “cupo” and “aportación” have not been 
calculated according to the effective cost of the services that the central government 
provides to, and the effective revenue that the central government raises in, the two 
regions under the Foral regime.  Instead, they have been calculated as a percentage of the 
difference between the national cost of those services not devolved and the national 
                                                  
5 Taxes are partially ceded over the years as is explained later in the text. During the first several years 
regions in the Common regime had no autonomous taxing authority to speak of.   6 
revenue of the taxes not devolved.
6  In effect, this formula allocates to the regions in the 
Foral regime some percentage of an artificially and narrowly defined national deficit.  
The percentage is a function of the region’s income share. Although the percentage was 
to have been updated as those shares changed overtime, it has not been changed since it 
was first established in 1981.  
 
The Foral regime regions also contribute to the central government’s solidarity fund. The 
“Fondo de Compensacion Interterritorial” (FCI), a conditional grant that supports 
investment spending and is designed to help the growth of poor regions, is considered a 
national service, and therefore the Foral regime regions, through the “cupo” or 
“aportación”, contribute to the solidarity fund. 
 
The Common regime underwent a substantial change, agreed upon in July 2001 and 
effective as of January 2002, that cedes substantial taxing authority to the regional 
governments. It is important though to describe the initial set up, as it has been the basis 
of the system for over twenty years, and it has conditioned the reforms undertaken. 
Initially the Common regime was characterized by having a fair amount of expenditure 
responsibility, but very little revenue autonomy. The regions in this regime were mainly 
financed by central government transfers, which accounted for more than 75 percent of 
the revenues of these regions.  The regions of the Common regime also had ceded taxes, 
although this was largely an administrative role since, unlike with the regions of the Foral 
regime, they had no authority to set tax rates and bases for these taxes.
7  These ceded 
taxes included the wealth tax, the inheritance tax, a tax on wealth transfers, and taxes on 
gambling, and accounted for approximately ten percent of the revenues of the regions.  
Finally regions in the Common regime could initially, and still are able to, impose some 
taxes and fees, for which they have complete authority to set rates and bases, although 
these revenue sources represent a small percentage of regional revenues (around four 
percent).   
 
The second layer of asymmetry established by the Constitution concerns the fifteen 
regions of the Common regime. The Constitution defines two alternative paths f or 
devolution of spending responsibilities, one slow and one fast.  This is set out in Articles 
143 and 151, which is how the two sets of regions are sometimes referred.  In effect the 
two groups were given different amounts of spending authority. The high-responsibility 
regions were responsible for health and education, in addition to all of the common 
responsibilities held by the ten low responsibility regions.
8 The Constitution specifies that 
eventually the two paths could meet, whereupon all of the regions in the Common regime 
would have identical spending responsibilities. That eventually occurred in January 2002 
                                                  
6 National deficit is also subtracted. 
 
7 In the 1997 reform, some limited authority to set parameters of the ceded taxes was devolved. 
 
8Common responsibilities are: 1. Forestry, agriculture, livestock and fisheries in internal waters; 2. 
Urbanism and housing; 3. Roads; 4. Ports and airports without commercial activity; 5. Hydraulic 
exploitations, channels and irrigation; 6. Environmental protection; 7. Monumental patrimony of the 
Autonomous Community, cultural promotion and of the regional languages, libraries, museums and 
conservatories; 8. Self-government institutions; 9. Internal commercial fairs, sports promotion and tourism.    7 
when the final transfer of health responsibilities was agreed upon. Health and education 
account for the largest part of the budget, representing more than 80 percent of the total 
spent by the high-responsibility regions (for more details see Monasterio and Suarez 
(1998)). 
 
As mentioned, the largest revenue source for regions in the Common regime has been 
transfers from the central government.  The unconditional grant was distributed according 
to formulas that differed for the high- and low-responsibility regions, but the most 
important factor for both was population.  Those regions responsible for health 
expenditures received a conditional health grant as well
9.  The regions with lower income 
per capita also receive a solidarity grant (FCI) and funds, mainly FEDER development 
funds, from the European Union.  
 
The way the transfers are determined has changed over time.  The initial method was 
based on cost, that is, the central government would transfer an amount equal to the 
historical cost (before decentralization) of the services that were devolved to each region. 
This method assumed that the regional allocation of spending made by the central 
government before the decentralization process had started was adequate.  This criterion 
was meant to be temporary, for the transition period, and in 1986 was changed to a 
distribution formula.  The idea was to have an allocation mechanism that would be a 
function of some indicators of need.  A weighted formula based on several variables was 
applied: population, insularity or not, area, separate provincial government or not, 
relative wealth and fiscal effort
10.  The weights were set not according to general 
economic principles, but rather to reproduce as close as possible the distribution that 
existed previously under the “effective cost” allocation, making sure that all regions 
received at least as much as under the previous allocation. 
 
Starting in 1986 financing agreements lasting for five-year periods were established.  
Every five years a revision would take place and a new agreement would be established 
for the following period.  Very few changes were introduced at the end of the first period 
(1987-1991),  with only a small revision of the weights in the distribution formula 
incorporated into the agreement for the second period (1992-1996).  The negotiations in 
1996 for the 1997-2001 period agreement led to fairly significant changes with respect to 
local revenue-raising authority.  Regions were granted some authority over rates for all 
previously ceded taxes as well as an additionally ceded 15 percent of the income tax.  For 
fear that the new changes would diminish the total funds available, Andalucia, Castilla-
La Mancha and Extremadura opted out of this reform, introducing additional complexity 
to an already cumbersome set up. The latest reform, effective January 2002, has 
established a financing system applicable to all fifteen regions under the Common 
Regime. As the differences between high and low responsibility regions have vanished, 
and health is no longer financed by a specific grant, the financing model has become 
more uniform and transparent. 
                                                  
9 In the 2002 system, health financing is integrated in the general financing and does not have a specific 
conditional grant anymore. 
10 Fiscal effort is calculated as the distance between the region’s share of revenues from personal income 
tax and the region’s share of GDP.   8 
 
In 1993, two years into the second five-year period, a substantial revision of the system, 
at least in spirit, was implemented.  The revision established a new approach that would 
be continued with the changes introduced in 1997 and in 2002.  The reform of 1993 
ceded to the autonomous communities an initial 15 percent of the income tax (IRPF), but 
with no authority to set tax rates.  The idea behind the reform was to involve the regional 
governments more deeply in the revenue process. There was an incentive to be more 
efficient in the collection of the tax, as the region would keep 15 percent of the fiscal 
effort above a reference value.  But there were final changes to the reform that introduced 
limits to the possible gains and guarantees for minimum revenues, as some regions were 
worried about the outcome.  
 
The latest reform, effective January 2002, is not restricted to a five-year period as were 
the previous reforms. This reform unified the financing scheme for all the fifteen regions 
in the Common Regime, a task that was eased by the fact that responsibilities finally 
converged for the high- and the low-responsibility regions. It has further simplified and 
clarified the model by eliminating the conditional grant for health, which is now financed 
within the general system. Finally it has increased by a significant amount the revenue 
responsibility of the regions. The central government has ceded approximately one third 
of the personal income tax and the value added tax, as well as special taxes on gas, 
alcohol or tobacco. It has also eased many of the restrictions on establishing rates and 
exemptions for the ceded taxes (except for the value added tax and the special taxes that 
are regulated by the European Union).   
 
These changes in the system have tried to accommodate complaints about the lack of 
autonomy in revenue within the Common regime.  The term used in Spain has been co-
responsibility, meaning a sharing of responsibility for revenues between central and 
regional governments.  As we have seen, the process towards higher regional 
responsibility in revenues has been slow, limited, and very complicated, as not all regions 
had initially participated, but the latest reform seems to go in the right direction in that 
regions are gaining revenue raising authority responsibility leading to possible gains in 
efficiency.
11  However, an important motivation behind the changes has been to try to 
keep more tax revenues in the regions where those taxes are paid.  Rich regions aimed to 
redefine the system in a way that reduces their contribution to solidarity, while poor 
regions tried to avoid that larger revenue autonomy would decrease the total amount of 
funds that they receive.  
 
While the two groups of regions under the Common regime—the high- and low-spending 
responsibility regions—started quite apart but eventually converged to identical 
circumstances, the Foral and Common regimes are intended to remain under different 
financial arrangements with the central government.  We explore the basis for such 
differential treatment in the next section.  
                                                  
11 The lack of local revenue authority together with the continuous renegotiation of the system over the past 
twenty years created a situation whereby regions may have had incentives to borrow in excess since they 
did not bear all the costs of such decisions (see Garcia-Milà, Goodspeed and McGuire (2001) for an 
elaboration of this argument).   9 
 
 
V.  Evaluation of the decentralization process in Spain 
 
Given the revealed differences in preferences and in administrative know-how, 
asymmetric decentralization was probably a good economic decision for Spain in the late 
1970s to early 1980s.  It probably also helped to ease some of the political tensions 
expressed by nationalists, mainly of the Basque Country, Catalonia and to a lesser extent 
Galicia.  Establishing a flexible system that could be revised was also important given the 
lack of experience in these matters for many regions and for the country as a whole. 
 
After twenty years, regions have caught up in knowledge, and probably also in 
preferences towards autonomy, although the latter is more questionable.
12  Under the new 
circumstances whereby regional governments have matured and citizens have gained 
experience with decentralized government, it is probably more efficient to move towards 
a system that gives up asymmetry for gains in simplicity, clarity, revenue autonomy, 
certainty, and transparency in solidarity. 
 
Spain has partly moved in this direction. Within the Common regime, convergence in 
spending responsibility has occurred: responsibilities in education were devolved to all 
regions in 2000, and devolution of responsibility for health was agreed upon in January 
2002.
13  Spain has also introduced some changes to the financing scheme, slowly moving 
towards a per capita distribution of grants and higher revenue responsibility for the 
regions. The recent changes towards higher revenue autonomy have been applied to all 
fifteen autonomous communities under the Common regime, a step toward simplicity and 
clarity. 
 
In one respect the complexity and transparency of the system have not improved much. 
Little has been done to discuss openly the degree of solidarity that regions can agree 
upon, or to establish clear and transparent equity criteria. The need for an open discussion 
about solidarity is revealed by the fact that rich regions sense that they are contributing 
too much, while poor regions believe that they receive too little.  Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, given the lack of open discussion concerning solidarity, regions have tried to 
push each new revision of the system towards the direction that will likely give them 
more funds. 
  
The most important asymmetry built into the system—the large difference between the 
Foral and the Common regimes—has remained unchanged, and appears not to be subject 
to change for the foreseeable future. 
                                                  
12 A sense of regional identity has developed in many autonomous communities.  This sense of identity is 
linked to the existence of and experience with autonomous government rather than strong cultural or 
language differences. 
 
13 The 2002 reform has responded to some of the demands of health economics experts (López Casasnovas 
1999) that have been calling for incorporating the health transfer in the general system (was previously 
financed by a conditional grant) and to include additional parameters, besides population, that take into 
account some characteristics of the population and the services provided.   10 
 
As several authors have pointed out, generalizing the Foral regime to other regions in the 
exact terms as currently applied to the Basque Country and Navarra would not be 
sustainable.  If all regions were under the Foral regime, and the payments to the central 
government (cupo or aportación) were similar to the ones set for Navarra and the Basque 
Country, all regions except Extremadura and Andalucia would keep more money than 
what they have right now (see Zubiri (2000) and Zubiri y Vallejo (1995)).  Castells 
(2000) has estimated that the ratio of per capita funds for the regions under the Foral 
regime is 1.8 times that of the five regions in the Common regime that have high 
spending responsibilities, these being the regions with expenditure responsibilities 
comparable to those of the Foral regions.  
 
The asymmetry is not only in terms of the degree of revenue autonomy but also in the 
details of implementation as a distinct revenue advantage has been given to the regions 
under the Foral regime.  While one can argue that the Foral regime had strong historical, 
political, and cultural reasons to prevail in the past, it is hard to argue from an economic 
efficiency perspective that such a disparate treatment is justified in the future. 
 
If asymmetric treatment is no longer justified, how should Spain move toward a more 
symmetric system?  The most crucial asymmetry in the system--the different systems 
applied to the Basque Country and Navarra on the one hand and to the other fifteen 
regions on the other--will be difficult to remove.  Applying a reformed Common regime 
to the two regions of the Foral regime would likely improve efficiency and transparency, 
and possibly political acceptability, at least among the fifteen regions of the Common 
regime.  As this change may be difficult to implement for historical reasons, if the Foral 
regime prevails, it is essential that the revenue advantages given to this group disappear. 
   
Within the Common regime, the fifteen regions should be given greater revenue-raising 
authority, especially for revenues at the margin. Any justification for current restrictions 
on regional taxing authority, such as lack of administrative know-how at the regional 
level or lack of trust by the central government, is no longer relevant given twenty years 
of experience with a decentralized system. 
 
While the Spanish system of decentralization needs flexibility and the possibility of 
revision, as do all political systems, it also needs a more solid foundation in basic 
principles so that there is less uncertainty about the future.  When regions are uncertain 
about the amount and source of funds and about the future rules of the game, they may 
engage in strategic behavior, face perverse incentives, and make inefficient decisions.  
Certainty, but not lack of flexibility, is needed to achieve efficiency. 
 
A move towards symmetry does not necessarily mean  that all regions end up with 
identical revenue and expenditure responsibilities.  Because of historical, cultural and 
language differences, some regions may choose to go further down the path of 
autonomous government than others.  If the choice of degree o f autonomy is available to 
all, and if greater expenditure responsibilities are linked to greater revenue-raising   11 




VI.  Relevance of the Spanish case for emerging democracies 
 
The Spanish decentralization system is often presented as an example for emerging 
democracies to follow.  The fact that Spain has been looked upon as a model to follow is 
probably not unrelated to the fact that, as mentioned above, the democratization and 
decentralization processes in Spain were tightly linked. 
 
There is no question that the peaceful and fast transition from a dictatorship to a 
democracy in Spain is a model to be followed by emerging democracies. There are few 
examples of comparably peaceful and successful transitions.  It is also true that the 
establishment of a decentralized state by the Constitution eased some nationalistic 
tensions and helped to accomplish the transition to a democratic system. So, in a broad 
sense, Spain is clearly a model to follow.  But, not all of the details of the decentralization 
process and system are worthy of imitation. 
 
Initial asymmetry may be justified if the emerging democracy has regions with cultural, 
ethnic or historical differences that are related to differences in taste for autonomy, or if 
there is some experience of decentralization for some regions but not for others.  Under 
these circumstances, it may be economically efficient to start with asymmetric 
decentralization. 
  
But asymmetry builds in complexity, sometimes linked to lack of transparency, and may 
hide perverse economic incentives resulting in inefficient regional decision making. 
Asymmetry also may build up regional tensions as over time regions become more alike 
in their preferences for autonomy and in their knowledge of autonomous administration, 
thus weakening the rationale for an asymmetric system.  What may be right at the start, 
may not be desirable in the long run.  And once asymmetry is established, it may be 
difficult to move to a symmetric system. 
 
We have identified a few problematic features of the Spanish system that may not be 
worthy of imitation.  
 
a.  Persistent asymmetric treatment over time, both in the financing regime but also in 
the details of the implementation, with differences in revenues per capita that are not 
justified by economic or solidarity arguments. It is important that these differences in 
treatment vanish over time so that the regions come to trust the system and do not 
engage in perverse behavior in order to obtain more from the central government.  
This desire to work for a better deal with the central government arises not only 
because the regions need more funds (more money is always welcome), but also 
because they want to achieve equal treatment. 
   12 
b.  The limited taxing authority of the fifteen regions in the Common regime breaks the 
link between the cost and the benefit of a public decision, and likely induces 
inefficient local public spending and excessive borrowing.  It also limits the choices 
of the regions and creates unsatisfied needs that could be avoided if the regions' 
residents are willing to finance local spending with regional taxes. 
 
c.  The continuous evolution of the system, without clear rules.  Constant re-negotiation 
of the system adds complexity and introduces uncertainty about the future.  It may 
trigger perverse strategic behavior on the part of the regions and result in political 
dissatisfaction.  
 
d.  The absence of an explicit discussion about regional solidarity.  Lack of agreement 
among regions on the proper level or range of redistribution creates numerous 
problems, adds instability and a lack of transparency, and creates incentives for 
inefficient economic behavior. 
 
Asymmetric fiscal decentralization has satisfied some nationalistic claims and eased 
tensions among regions in Spain, and it has provided an important foundation for a stable 
transition to democracy.  However, if certain aspects of the system had been designed 
differently, the economic outcome would be more efficient and Spain would have a 
system today that the regions would find more satisfactory.  Emerging democracies can 
learn from the Spanish experience and design a decentralized system that achieves 
autonomy and solidarity at a smaller cost. 
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Table 1:  1999 GDP per Capita of Regions in Spain 









Spain = 100) 
Foral Regime 
Navarra  18,492  (130) 
País Vasco  17,379  (122) 
     
Common Regime 
High Responsibility 
Andalucía  10,067  (71) 
Canarias  13,496  (95) 
Cataluña  17,570  (124) 
Galicia  11,266  (79) 
Valenciana  13,510  (95) 
Low Responsibility 
Aragón  15,464  (109) 
Asturias  12,739  (90) 
Baleares  17,514  (123) 
Cantabria  13,410  (95) 
Castilla-León  12,990  (92) 
Castilla-La Mancha  11,617  (82) 
Extremadura  8,774  (62) 
Madrid  19,254  (136) 
Murcia  11,692  (82) 
La Rioja  16,313  (115) 
 
 
GDP data are from Contabilidad Regional de España, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 
Population data are from Proyecciones y Estimaciones Intercensales de Población, INE. 